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ABSTRACT 
The paper looks at the trends in nominal and real salaries of the Federal 
Government employees over the period 1990-2006.  It examines the structural 
defects in the existing salary structure and the anomalies in the allowances 
structure to show that appropriate remuneration for the civil servants requires 
serious and urgent consideration. The widening gap in the emoluments of 
government employees versus the public sector corporations and private sector 
employees has a strong bearing on the motivation and ability to work. The paper 
makes serious recommendations to overhaul the existing structure of salaries 
and perks to make the public sector employment competitive and cost-effective. 
 

 
 
Civil Servants’ Salary Structure1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The civil service in a large part of the world still guarantees security of 
jobs over the full working life, and this is highly valued by the employees 
especially in developing countries where employment opportunities are scarce.  
The salary structure of the civil service deserves special attention because it 
determines the quality of personal hired.  While many other factors also affect 
the performance of the employees, the financial rewards have a strong bearing 
on the motivation and performance of the staff. This is particularly so 
considering the ever-widening gap between the wages of the public and the 
private sectors in most of the developing countries.   
In Pakistan independent pay commissions headed by senior retired civil 
servants have always fixed the pay scales. The first pay commission of 1948-49 
rejected the colonial wage structure because of widespread divergence in the pay 
scales of high-paid British officials and the lower-grade local officers.  It 
recommended a judious salary structure.  The commission prescribed a living 
wage (undefined) for the low paid employees, and advised conservatism and 
wage restraint for the remaining categories.  The commission also ruled that 
men of genius belonged to the private sector and not the public sector.  The 
government however disassociated itself from this viewpoint and the next pay 
commission of 1970 strongly emphasised the need to provide adequate 
compensation and due recognition as incentives for persons of highest caliber to 
seek employment in the public sector.2 Later the commission also recommended 
further rationalisation of salary structures.  The pay commission of 1972 
eventually compressed the 650 pay scales to 22 national pay scales.  The 
subsequent pay commissions of 1977, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1994, 2001 and 2005 
have continued with these twenty-two scales with the declared objective of 
narrowing the gap between the highest paid and the lowest paid.  However, this 
gap remains fixed at 1:9 for the last four salary revisions between 1991 and 
2005.  This coupled with low real wages, increasing trend towards contract 
employment, and no motivation to excel makes the government employment 
least attractive compared to the private sector.3  
                                                 
1The paper deals with the salary structure of the Federal Government employees of general 
services only; special groups/cadres like the Foreign Service, the Prime Minister’s Secretariat 
employees, MP grades, etc., are not covered here. 
2See Irfan (1989). 
3See Haque and Kim (1994). 
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The vibrant private sector growth with attractive salary packages, training 
opportunities, and modern Human Resource Development (HRD) is the focus of 
talented individuals. Furthermore, within the government the salary structures of 
the various public sector corporations are close to those of the private sector 
while the rest of the government is stuck with 22 grades. Thus the gap between 
the salaries of civil servants and employees of government corporations as well 
as the private sector continues to widen.4  The civil servants therefore, lack the 
right incentives to perform. This paper examines some of the structural 
problems underlying the pay scales of the Federal Government employees as 
well as the trends in salaries and allowances as they have evolved overtime.  The 
lengthy and over lapping pay scales are a disincentive to efficient workers.   
The paper is structured as follows: Section II analyses the existing salary 
structure in the light of recent revisions. Section III analyses the allowance 
structures and the associated anomalies.  Section IV gives an over view of the 
trends in real salaries of the civil servants for the period 1990-91 to 2005-06, 
and provides a comparison of pubic and private sector wages.  Finally, Section 
V concludes the paper with some suggestions/recommendations.   
 
II.  SALARY STRUCTURE 
  
(a)  Determination of Basic Minimum Salary 
Pay Commissions in determining the pay structure fixes the minimum 
wage as a reference point for the pays and salaries of the other government 
employees.  The minimum wages may be ascertained in a number of ways.5   
 • Firstly, minimum wages of the government employees may be fixed by 
taking into consideration the market wages of the unskilled workers.  
However, because market wage rate is itself influenced by the wages set 
by the government, such an approach is not very useful. Besides, market 
wages may or may not be sufficiently high to provide for the basic 
necessities of the workers.  In view of the social dimension of the wage 
rate structure to which the government is committed, such an approach 
does not seem to be very appropriate.   
 • Secondly, the proposed minimum wages in the new pay structure may 
be no less than the wages sufficient to purchase the bundle of goods and 
services which the least paid employees could buy at the time minimum 
wages were fixed in the previous pay scales.  Such an approach implies 
that nominal wages are adjusted upwards by the rate of inflation over the 
intervening period.   
                                                 
4For a comprehensive analysis of pay gaps in the public and the private sectors in Pakistan, 
see Hyder and Reilly (2005). 
5See the Kemal and Bilquees (1994) paper prepared for the 1994 Pay Commission. 
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 • Thirdly, the minimum wages may be set at a level which does not result 
into a deterioration in the economic position of the least paid employee 
in the society.  In order to ensure that, real wages must be increased at a 
rate equaling to the increase in productivity. Accordingly, the nominal 
wages have to be adjusted for both the inflation rate as well as the gains 
in productivity.  
 • Fourthly, the minimum wages are set in such a way that the expenditure 
on food out of the income, in accordance with the preference of the 
consumer for food and non-food consumption, is sufficient to meet the 
caloric requirements. This approach implies that minimum wages should 
be at least sufficient to provide the basic needs. 
Prior to the last revision of 2005, pay scales have been revised by the 
various independent pay commissions on the following principle: at every 
revision of basic salary all relief and indexation granted in the previous period 
are merged into basic salary of the last period.  (This is considered as total basic 
salary in this paper.)  A certain increase on the total basic salary determines the 
revised basic minimum salary of the next period.   
The trends in percentage increases in basic salaries are shown in 
Appendix Table I, and Figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1.  Percentage Increases in Basic Salaries 
 
 
It will be seen that the variations in average markups over the four 
revisions and between the grades are quite huge. With an inflation rate of 13 
percent over the period 1990-91 the new pay scales announced in June 1991 
granted a 39.4 percent increase to grade 1, the increase declined gradually to 27 
percent for grade 12.  All the grades above that received a fixed markup of 26 
percent. With an inflation rate of 11.5 percent over the period 1993-94, in the 
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reversed: it varied from 2.7 percent for grade 1 to 20 percent for grade 22.  After 
a gap of six years the next revision in December 2001 saw a shift in the policy: 
it froze the maximum relief allowance—the Special Additional Allowance—it 
was not included to the computation of the total basic salary.  With the exclusion 
of this allowance, the markups for grades 1 to 17 increased in ascending order 
from 8 to 22.2 percent, and were constant at 49.5 for the remaining five grades 
in December 2001.  For the last revision of July 2005 the revised scales were 
determined as follows: all the three relief allowances granted between December 
2001 and July 2005 were frozen for all the grades, and the basic minimum 
salaries of all grades in 2001 were increased by 15 percent to arrive at the new 
pay scales.  The ratio of the highest to the lowest paid remained 1:9 over the 
four revisions. 
Since the pay commission reports are “confidential” it is not possible to 
ascertain the reasons for the shift in methodology.  However, the shift raises an 
important issue: how does one account for the erosion of the real value of these 
allowances considering inflation rates of 9.3 percent in 2004-05 and 6.6 percent 
in 2005-06?  Does the 15 percent increase in the basic salary of 2001 
compensate for the loss due to exclusion of allowances and the erosion in their 
real value overtime in July 2005? 
To sum up, the average nominal increases fluctuated widely from 29.5 
percent in 1991 to 9.9 percent 1994, 23.6 percent in 2001, and 15 percent in 
2005.6  However the real wages continued to decline overtime as shown in 
Figure 2. 
 
Fig. 2.  Indices of Real Wages 
 
                                                 
6Average markups during the previous revisions over the period 1978-91 ranged between 
12.3 to 13.7  percent only [see Bilquees (1994)]. 
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(b)  Length of the Pay Scales7 
The length of the pay scales refers to the number of stages (number of 
increments to be earned) to reach the maximum of the scale as shown in Table 1.  
The distribution of the stages between the gazetted and non-gazetted scales is 
biased in favour of higher grades. Compared to the nineties, these stages have 
doubled from 15 to 30 for   grades 1 to16.  For grades 17 to 19 the stages are 
increased by more than half (12 to 20 stages), and for grades 20 to 22 they have 
increased by less than half (10 to14 stages) since 2001. 
 
Table 1 
Number of Stages between the Minimum and the Maximum of a Scale 
1-16 17 17-19 18-22 20-22 
Years/Grades No. of Stages Required to Reach the Maximum of a Scale 
1991 15 12 – 10 – 
1994 15 12 – 10 – 
2001 30 – 20 – 14 
2005 30 – 20 – 14 
 
These extremely long pay scales have their pros and cons: they are 
undesirable because they are both inefficient and uneconomic.  The inefficiency 
arises due to unhindered payment of increments to all irrespective of their work 
input.  This rules out the difference between efficient and non-efficient workers, 
hence there is no incentive to perform.  They are uneconomical because 
inefficient employees continue to receive increments until they reach the 
maximum of the scale. The lengthy scales are desirable compared to the shorter 
scales only because the latter would require rapid promotions.  In other words, 
the limited availability of posts in each scale, or the prospects for promotion 
would affect the length of scale.   
Lengthy pay scales are indeed a very regressive feature of the civil 
service salary structure.  An employee stuck on the same job for 15 to 30 years 
earning annual increments only, with no prospects of improvement in his living 
insight is bound to lose all motivation to work over the coming years.  
 
(c)  Overlapping of Pay Scales 
Another important issue related to the salary structure is that by how 
much salary scales should overlap?  Scales overlap when the maximum of one 
scale is higher than the minimum of the next higher scale(s).  In the advanced 
industrialised countries, civil service salary scales do not overlap by more than 
two higher scales.  In Pakistan however overlapping of grades is a serious issue 
as shown in Table 2 below. 
                                                 
7Sections IIb, IIc, and IId are based on Chew (1992). 
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Table 2 
Overlapping of Pay Scales 
Years of 
Salary 
Revision 
Grades with 
Zero Overlap 
Grades with 
3 Overlaps 
Grades with 
4-9 Overlaps 
Grades with 
10-14 
Overlaps 
1991 22 14-21 7-13 1-6 
1994 22 14-21 7-13 1-6 
2001 22 15-17 
19-21 
7-14 
18 
1-6 
2005 22 15-17 
19-21 
7-14 
18 
1-6 
1991-94  38.1% 33.3% 28.6% 
2001-05  28.6% 42.8% 28.6% 
 
Excluding grade 22 with zero overlap, of the remaining 21 grades 
overlapping of up to three grades has declined from 38.1 percent to 28.6 percent 
between 1991 and 2005.  However the grades with 4 to 9 overlaps increased 
from 33.3 percent to 42.8 percent over the same period. The lowest six scales 
overlap by 10 to 14 grades in all the four revisions.  Overall, the proportion of 
grades overlapping by more than three grades increased from 62 percent during 
the 1990s to 71 percent during 2001-05. Overlapping of scales permits staff in 
lower grades to earn the same salary as those in higher grades. For example, a 
senior clerk in scale six in the 2005 pay scales has an overlap of 10 grades, 
therefore overtime employees in grade 1 to 7 could all earn the initial salary of 
grade-8 (see Appendix Table II).  Thus, overlapping of scales undermines the 
linkage between pay and work.   
 
(d)  Increments   
In the civil services of the developed countries, an increment is always 
“earned” by way of crossing some efficiency bar. In Pakistan until 1981 an 
efficiency bar always had to be crossed in the form of satisfactory special report 
on performance to receive the larger sum (see Appendix Table III).  The 1983 
Pay Commission observed that the efficiency bars were crossed almost 
automatically and hence were discarded. This automatic grant of the increments 
without consideration to performance would obviously have adverse effects on 
motivation and efficiency compared to when it is “earned”.  The lengthy pay 
scales and extreme overlapping, with continued payments of increments results 
in a decline in efficiency and dis-incentives to be a productive worker. A 
rational choice would have been to ensure the enforcement, rather than abolition 
of the clause of efficiency bar. 
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To sum up, lengthy scales, extensive overlapping and unconditional grant 
of increments weaken the linkage between pay and work, and contribute to 
unequal levels of work within one grade.  Overlapping of grades makes it worse 
among the grades, and the linkage between work content and salary vanishes or 
becomes more inequitable. 
 
III.  PERKS 
 
(a)  Housing Allowance 
The accommodation facility/allowance provided to the federal government 
employees falls into three categories: (i) those who make their own living 
arrangements instead of renting house on government account, they receive fifty 
percent of the basic salary as housing subsidy; (ii) those who requisite houses in the 
open market at the official rental ceiling; and (iii) those who are provided 
government accommodation.  The last two categories pay 5 percent of gross salary 
as house rent recovery (or partial tax on the allowance) that also provides towards 
maintenance of houses on government account.8  All categories of this allowance are 
highly valued by the employees. However it is important to note that employees 
hiring houses in the open market face serious hardships due to the failure of the 
government to impose rent control in the federal capital. 
In Table 3, we see that house rents have been increased before or after each 
salary revision.  However, grades up to 18 have been lumped in to six groups for 
the allocation of house rent.  The rationale behind this policy is not known, but it 
raises a serious anomaly: the higher salary results in lower house rent entitlement 
up to grade 18 (see section c of the table).  This erosion has serious implications 
for the very poor households in the lower grades, indeed it looks very awkward 
even for grades seventeen and eighteen as shown in Figure 3. 
Although house rent is the most valuable cash allowance for employees 
renting houses, this facility pales in comparison to the physical government 
housing.  It is rather awkward if we compare a secretary renting his own house 
or a portion in any house at the official entitlement in Islamabad (that is what 
one can get at the market rate), with a colleague living in government built 
accommodation.  While the former gets monthly house rent amounting to Rs 
16,962 the government accommodation carries an imputed rental value of more 
than Rs 100,000 since it is independent occupancy, is built on a larger space, 
and has all amenities like servant quarters, porch, modern kitchen facilities etc. 
Furthermore, it is an open secret that many people in top positions live in 
government housing while their own houses (generally in the name of spouses) 
are rented out at market rates.  
                                                 
8The employees of semi-government organisations are not entitled to the maintenance 
facility despite the 5 percent deduction. 
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Table 3 
Adjusted Rental Ceilings and Percentage Changes by Grades 
 a. Absolute Amount (Rs/Month) b. Percent Increase 
Grade 1990-91 1993-94 1996-97 2000-01 2003-04 1993-94 1996-97 2000-01 2003-04 
1-2 594 760 912 1049 1207 25 20 15 15 
3-6 950 1188 1425 1639 1886 25 20 15 15 
7-10 1425 1781 2138 2459 2826 25 20 15 15 
11-13 2138 2684 3221 3704 4261 25 20 15 15 
14-16 2684 3373 4047 4654 5353 26 20 15 15 
17-18 3563 4465 5358 6162 7087 25 20 15 15 
19 4750 5938 7125 8194 9424 25 20 15 15 
20 5938 7458 8949 10291 11837 25 20 15 15 
21 7125 8930 10716 12323 14174 25 20 15 15 
22 8550 10688 12825 14749 16962 25 20 15 15 
 
c.  House Rent as a Percent of Basic Salary 
 Grades 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
H.R.   % of  
Basic Salary 56 55 83 80 78 76 110 106 102 99 143 135 127 100 142 122 99 76 
  
Fig. 3.  House Rent as a Percentage of Basic Salary 
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A fair and objective policy would be the provision of government 
accommodation to all employees, or to no one. 
In the current budget house rent has been declared a part of the taxable 
income.  This can be simplified by monetising this cash/in-kind benefit.  It will 
also help government to get rid of the huge infrastructure maintained to run this 
facility.  Alternatively, all employees at all levels be provided government built 
accommodation. 
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(b)  Conveyance Allowance 
Whether an employee owns a vehicle or not all employees upto grade 20 
are paid conveyance allowance in-cash while the two highest grades are 
provided fully maintained staff cars for official and private use.  For the purpose 
of this study it is assumed that all employees below grade 18 do not maintain a 
car. Therefore the employees in grade 18-20 receive a car maintenance 
allowance. 
The absolute amounts of conveyance allowance, its rate of increase over 
time, and the allowance as percentage of basic salary for all grades are reported 
in Table 4 (a, b, c).  The employees up to grade 19 are lumped in to five broad 
groups for the payment of conveyance allowance.  Therefore as in case of house 
rent, when calculated as a percent of the basic salary this practice results in 
losses to employees of higher grades.  The loss, is particularly more pronounced 
between grades 16 to 20 (see Section-c Table 4, and Figure 4). This practice of 
lumping grades for house rent and conveyance allowances is rather ambiguous. 
 
Table 4 
Absolute and Percent Increases in the Conveyance Allowance, by  
Groups of Employees 
a. Absolute Conveyance Allowance b. Percent Increase   
Grades 1-Jul-91 1-Jul-94 1-Jul-01 1-Jul-05 1-Jul-91 1-Jul-94 1-Jul-01 1-Jul-05 
1-4 96 96 170 340 26 0 77 100 
5-10 96 96 170 460 26 0 77 171 
11-15 193 193 340 680 154 0 76 100 
16-19 193 355 620 1240 20 84 75 100 
20 355 355 620 1240 120 0 75 100 
 
c. Absolute Conveyance Allowance as a Percent of Basic Salary 
C. Grades 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
CA as % of 
Basic Salary 16 15 15 14 19 18 18 17 16 16 23 21 20 19 18 28 17 13 9 7  
 
The conveyance facility of grade 21 and 22 for official and private use 
includes tax-free cars of 1000 and 1300cc respectively; fully indexed fuel of 180 
and 360 litres (Petrol) per month, full maintenance and repairs, as well as 
uniformed drivers.  It will be seen from Table 5 that in 2005-06 only the fuel 
payment of grade 21 amounts to 51 percent of the basic salary while that of 
grade-22 constitutes 94 percent of the basic salary of the grade. Conservative 
estimates of maintenance of official cars are shown in Table 5.  The current 
budget also includes a rather complicated procedure to tax this privilege, 
however the simple solution again would be to monetise this facility and make it 
a part of the salary package, and do away with the vast network of maintaining/ 
running of official transport. 
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Fig. 4. Absolute Conveyance Allowance as a Percent of Basic Salary 
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Table 5 
Monthly Cost of Fully Maintained Cars 
  
 
Litres of 
Fuel 
 
 
Cost of 
Fuel (Rs) 
Driver’s 
Salary 
Excluding 
Overtime 
 
 
Token 
Tax 
 
 
Mainte-
nance 
 
 
 
Total 
 
Fuel as % 
of Basic 
Salary 
144 1698 1769 10 1000 4477 31 BPS-21
 1990-91   
  2005-06 180 9482 5673 29 3000 18184 51 
192 2264 1769 10 1200 5243 39 BPS-22
 1990-91 
 2005-06 360 18965 5673 29 3500 28167 94 
 
(c)   Grade-specific Allowances9 
The grade-specific allowances include washing allowance for employees 
in Grades 1 to 4; and entertainment allowance, senior post allowance, and 
orderly allowance for Grades 20 to 22.  Washing Allowance is granted for the 
maintenance of the uniform provided to the employees.  This allowance has 
increased from Rs 65.00 in 1990-91 to Rs 85 in 1994 and finally to Rs 150 in 
2005. 
Entertainment allowance now admissible to grade 19 also, is granted to 
senior officials for the entertainment of official guests at office or residence. 
                                                 
9Telephone facility and medical allowance are not included here in.  The unlimited 
telephone entitlement to the highest grade makes it very difficult to account for it.  Similarly, in case 
of health care known but unaccountable privileges at the higher levels cannot be quantified. 
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These include in-office meetings and/or special assignments requiring 
subordinates to consult the officials at residence. 
Senior Post Allowance is presumably meant to maintain a certain 
minimum gap between the highest-paid and the lowest-paid. 
Orderly Allowance was introduced in 1985-86 and was initially 
admissible only if an orderly for domestic duties was actually hired.  This was 
meant to promote employment of lower-income groups.  However, this 
condition was waived later and it is now part of the salary.  All the allowances 
for the highest grades are reported in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 
Grade-specific Allowances for the Three Highest Grades 
Years 1990-91 1994-95 1996-97 2002-03 2003-04 2005-06 
 Grades 
Allowances Grade 20 
Entertainment 400 400 400 450 450 600 
Special P. Allow. 200 600 800 850 850 1100 
Orderly Allow. 800 1000 1000 1900 2375 2375 
 Grade 21 
Entertainment 450 450 450 525 525 700 
Special P. Allow. 400 800 800 925 925 1200 
Orderly Allow. 800 1000 1000 1900 2375 2375 
 Grade 22 
Entertainment 650 650 650 725 725 975 
Special P. Allow. 600 1000 1000 1200 1200 1600 
Orderly Allow 800 1000 1000 2375 2375 2375 
 
To summarise, the practice to club together various grades arbitrarily for 
the allowances makes the allowances structure very inequitable. The housing 
allowance versus the government housing is a serious anomaly to be resolved.  
Similarly the distribution of conveyance allowance between grades 1 to 20 and 
between grade 21 and 22 has serious implications for the distribution of income. 
The regular allowances granted to groups of grades tend to favour the lower 
grades in these groups.  The grade-specific allowances of the highest income 
groups apparently make the salary structures look very inequitable.  
 
IV. WELFARE OF THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES: 1990-91–2005-06 
Trends in the real salaries of federal government employees are analysed 
with reference to: (a) indices of real wages indicating the increase or decrease in 
welfare of the employees in each grade and between different grades; and (b) the 
proportional gains in the welfare of the federal employees vis-à-vis the rest of 
the public in terms of GNP per capita. 
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(a)  Indices of Real Wages 
The trends in the indices of real wages as shown in Table 7 are analysed 
with reference to the increases in salaries granted overtime.10 
The first revision of salaries effective June 1991, granted a maximum 
markup of 39 percent to grade 1, decreasing gradually to 27 percent for grade 
12, the remaining grades were granted a uniform increase of 26 percent.  
Consequently, the real wages of all grades increased ranging from 30 percent for 
grade 1 to only 3 percent for grade 22 in one year.  However due to the rise in 
inflation rate from 9.3 percent in 1991-92 to 11 percent in 1992-93 only grades 1 
to 10 and grade 13 sustained positive real wages. Grades 11 and 12 may have 
been affected negatively due to the pairing of grades for the allowances. The 
further increase in inflation rate to 11.5 percent in the fiscal year 1993-94 led to 
the second revision of June 1994. This revision reversed the markup in basic 
salaries in favour of higher grades—it increased from 2.7 percent for grade 1 to 
20 percent for the two highest grades.  However this revision failed to mitigate 
fully the effects of erosion due to double digit inflation:  real wages for grades 
16 to 22 remained negative, while grades 1 to 15 earned a positive but declining 
real wage.  For both the revisions the ratio of the highest paid to the lowest paid 
remained 1:9. 
Contrary to the policy of salary revisions every three years, the next 
revision was delayed for six years when Pakistan faced serious fiscal constraints 
under the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programmes.11  This delay however had 
serious implications for real earnings of the civil servants for the three years 
1995-1997. Double digit inflation persisted until 1996-97 resulting in negative 
real wage for all grades except for grades 1, 2 and 4.  
In the following two years between July 1997 to June 1999 inflation 
declined to single digits (7.4 and 5.7), but in the absence of any salary 
adjustments real wages were negative for all the 22 grades during 1997-8 and 
1998-9.  This outcome was repeated in the following year. 
The third revision of pay scales in December 2001 saw a shift in the 
existing methodology of salary revision. The Special Additional Allowance was 
frozen in the calculation of Total Basic Salary.  The salary revision resulted in 
positive real wage for grades 1, 2 and 4 by increases of 5, 4 and 1 percent 
respectively in 2001-02, and only grade 1 registered an increase of 2 percent 
despite the decline in inflation rate to only 2.9 percent in 2002-03.  Inflation rate 
increased to 9.3 percent in 2004-05 and the real wages were negative for all 
grades except for grades 1 and 2.  Thus the severe erosion of the salaries in the 
nineties  could  not  be  recouped  despite the continued decline in inflation from  
                                                 
10An important caveat may be noted here: the trends in real wages do not reflect the market 
value of the perks granted to the federal government employees particularly at the level of four 
highest grades. 
11This aspect is also studied by Kraay, Aart and Van Rijckeghem (1996). 
Table 7 
Indices of Real Wages as a Percent of GNP: 1991-92 to 2005-06 
  Index Number 
BPS 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 
22 100 103 93 91 91 87 85 79 79 90 92 98 95 97 99 101 
21 100 104 94 92 92 88 86 80 79 82 84 91 88 89 90 92 
20 100 107 97 95 92 88 85 79 74 77 78 87 85 85 83 85 
19 100 106 96 94 91 85 81 75 71 75 76 86 83 81 80 84 
18 100 107 98 97 93 87 84 78 74 77 79 88 85 89 88 90 
17 100 105 96 96 91 85 83 77 73 75 77 84 81 85 83 85 
16 100 104 95 95 90 83 84 78 74 78 80 78 76 79 76 79 
15 100 109 99 102 94 87 90 84 79 84 87 91 88 92 89 90 
14 100 108 98 101 92 86 89 83 78 83 86 89 87 90 87 89 
13 100 111 101 103 95 88 92 85 80 85 88 92 90 93 90 93 
12 100 107 98 100 93 87 91 84 80 84 87 91 88 92 89 91 
11 100 108 98 101 94 87 91 85 80 85 88 91 88 92 89 91 
10 100 114 104 104 95 88 93 86 82 88 90 94 91 95 93 96 
9 100 114 104 104 95 88 94 87 82 89 91 94 91 95 93 96 
8 100 114 104 105 95 88 94 87 82 89 91 93 91 94 92 95 
7 100 114 104 105 95 88 94 87 82 89 91 93 91 94 92 95 
6 100 119 108 107 97 91 96 89 85 93 94 97 94 98 96 101 
5 100 120 109 108 98 91 97 90 85 94 95 98 95 99 97 102 
4 100 121 110 109 102 95 101 94 89 97 98 101 98 101 99 103 
3 100 120 109 108 98 91 97 90 85 93 94 97 94 97 95 99 
2 100 127 116 113 103 96 103 96 90 100 100 104 100 104 103 108 
1 100 130 118 115 104 98 105 97 92 102 102 105 102 105 104 110 
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12.5 percent in 1996-97 to 2.9 percent in 2002-03.  This outcome can be directly 
attributed to the delay of six years in the revision of salaries without due 
consideration to the inflation rate and it consequences. 
The final revision of salaries in 2005, as described earlier was based 
purely on a 15 percent increase of the basic salary of 2001 while all the relief 
allowances were frozen.  The decline in inflation to 6.6 percent in 2005-06 led to 
an increase in real wages of grades 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 by 10, 8, 3, 2 and 1 percent 
respectively.  The highest grade also registered a 1 percent increase for once.  
The latter may be explained by the exceptionally high increase in the senior post 
and entertainment allowance for the highest grade.  Overall the position of 
almost all grades deteriorated after 1993-94 with minor exceptions. 
 
(b)  Nominal Salaries as Percent of GNP Per Capita 
 
  To ascertain the gains in welfare of the government employees 
compared to the rest of the public we estimate their salaries as a percentage of 
GNP per capita as: 
{[(TNS/DPE)*12]/GNPc*100} 
where TNS is the total nominal salary of a grade including all allowances. 
DPE is the dependents per earner in that income group. The ratio 
TNS/DPE is Multiplied by 12 to the nominal income per year because the GNP 
statistics are not available on monthly basis. 
This ratio is divided by the GNP per capita (GNPc) and multiplied by 100 
to get the salaries of employees in different grades as a percent of the GNP per 
capita.  This shows the income differential of the government employees vis-à-
vis  the employees in similar income groups.  It measures the gains and losses of 
the federal employees over and above the GNP per capita earned by the non-
government sector.12 
All the statistics related to salaries and allowances used in this study are 
taken from government notifications issued over time.  Statistics on dependents 
per person according to income groups is taken from the Household Income and 
Expenditure Surveys (various issues).  It is derived by dividing the family 
members by the number of earners in a household. The GNP figures are taken 
from the Pakistan Economic Survey (various issues). 
Estimates of nominal salary as a percent of the GNP per capita reported in 
Table 8 confirm that the civil servants are at the lowest rung of the per capita 
earnings.  Furthermore, only employees in grades 1-10 earned more than the 
GNP per capita until 1993-94.   The  table shows  a declining  trend  in the gains 
of all the employees  overtime while  GNP  per  capita  increased throughout the  
                                                 
12See Haque and Sahay (1995). 
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Table 8 
Indices of Nominal Wages as a Percent of GNP: 1990-91 to 2004-05 
BPS 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06
22 100 99 92 88 85 82 80 76 74 70 70 73 67 65 63 60 
21 100 100 93 104 85 82 81 76 74 64 64 68 62 60 57 54 
20 100 103 96 107 85 82 80 75 70 60 59 65 60 57 53 50 
19 100 102 95 107 85 80 76 72 67 58 57 64 58 55 51 49 
18 100 104 96 110 87 82 79 74 69 60 60 66 60 60 56 53 
17 100 102 95 109 85 80 78 73 68 59 59 63 57 57 53 50 
16 100 101 94 108 84 78 80 75 70 61 61 58 53 53 49 47 
15 100 105 98 115 87 81 85 80 74 65 66 67 62 61 56 53 
14 100 105 97 115 86 81 84 80 74 64 66 67 61 61 56 52 
13 100 107 100 117 88 82 86 81 75 66 67 69 63 62 58 54 
12 100 105 97 114 87 82 86 81 75 66 67 68 62 62 57 54 
11 100 104 97 114 87 81 86 81 75 66 67 68 62 62 57 54 
10 100 109 102 117 88 82 87 82 76 68 68 70 63 63 59 56 
9 100 110 102 118 88 82 87 82 77 68 69 70 63 63 59 56 
8 100 110 102 118 88 82 88 82 77 68 69 69 63 63 58 56 
7 100 110 102 118 88 82 88 83 77 69 69 69 63 63 58 56 
6 100 116 108 122 91 86 92 86 80 73 72 73 67 67 62 60 
5 100 116 108 123 91 86 92 86 81 73 72 73 67 67 62 60 
4 100 116 108 123 94 88 94 89 83 75 74 75 68 68 63 60 
3 100 117 108 123 92 86 92 87 81 73 72 73 66 66 61 59 
2 100 124 115 129 96 91 98 92 86 79 77 78 71 70 66 64 
1 100 125 116 130 97 92 98 93 86 79 78 78 71 71 66 65 
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period. The declining trend is more pronounced for the higher grades compared 
to the lower grades.13 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The pay scales of the civil service in Pakistan is beset with structural 
defects in terms of length of scales, overlaps, and unhindered payments of 
increments since 1983. The basic salary structure suffers from a number of 
anomalies resulting in widening of gaps between work and pay and hence the 
loss of incentive to work.  Revision of salary scales has become a mechanical 
exercise subject to the fiscal constraint of the federal government.  The shift in 
the methodology of determination of salary revisions for 2005 reflects adversely 
on the policy-makers considering the loss of real salary due to the freezing of 
allowances over three revisions, while inflation peaked at 9.3 percent in 2004-05 
and stood at 6.6 percent in 2005-06.  
Furthermore the grant and allocation of allowances has its own 
ambiguities leading to serious distortions in remuneration among grades.  Indeed 
this system of perks has many drawbacks: it creates an infrastructure for the 
maintenance of housing and cars, which at its best is inefficient, and at it’s worst 
both inefficient and corrupt, resulting in loss of tax resources.  It also insulates 
the government servants who are in charge of policy from realities of life such 
as renting houses and paying for cars. Monetisation of house rents will ease the 
rent situation as the employees would prefer to save by acquiring the minimum 
required accommodation.  Currently they tend to hire houses according to their 
full entitlements because there is no rebate on the house rent recovery, or in the 
tax on the allowance if they pay a rent lower than their entitlement.  The 
conveyance facility of the two highest grades defies all sense of proportions 
compared to the other grades.  The unlimited telephone facility is totally against 
the basic fiscal norm of user charge.  Indeed all these factors suggest that the 
people heading the various pay commissions are prevailed upon to maintain the 
status-quo. 
The erosion of real salaries particularly of the higher grades and the very 
low nominal salaries of all grades compared to the non-government sector 
(despite exclusion of tax deductions) reflects the importance government 
attaches to the living standards of its workers.  The indexation of salaries to the 
inflation rate was granted only once in the eighties.  However in the nineties the 
fiscal constraint is met by the postponement of salary revisions for up to six 
years, and is substituted by the irregular, piecemeal, token increases in relief and 
other allowances.  The new trend of freezing the relief allowances in the revision 
of salaries is a serious anomaly with negative consequences for those at the 
receiving end. 
                                                 
13The caveat in footnote (9) also applies in this case. 
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In the light of the findings of this study the following recommendations 
are put forward for consideration. 
The lengthy and excessively overlapping pay scales and the unhindered 
payment of increments need to be revamped significantly to establish a 
“connect” between pay and work and to promote career advancement. One 
possibility is to create sub-grades clearly identifying duties and remunerations, 
coupled with a strict code of conduct.  However, a more efficient way out of this 
maze of existing salary structure is to monetise all the perks at the market rate 
and add to the basic wage fully indexed.  This begs the question: how to 
determine the salaries thereafter? Governments in industrialised market 
economies have generally taken the level of pay in other employing sectors as 
the basic point of reference when determining the remuneration of their 
employees.  It is fair to pay the civil servants at the same rate as private 
companies and public corporations if the government wishes to attract and retain 
a motivated work force. Intelligent and motivated managers and administrators 
are the need of the civil service.  Only right people in the right places can help 
put this distorted, corrupt and inefficient structure back in place. 
The issue of monetisation of perks has overtime been brushed aside on 
the pretext of lack of resources, but as pointed out earlier it is more an issue of 
maintaining the status quo.  The three possible avenues to finance this 
monetisation include:14  first, all the donor’s money being offered for the civil 
service reforms could be considered for this package at some levels at least.  
Secondly, money received from an auction/sale of all government housing 
which remains inadequate forever, as well as the auction of official vehicles 
could be used to help civil servants to purchase their own vehicles on lease, to 
be run and maintained by themselves, compared to the lengthy procedures 
announced to tax this facility.  Similarly, loans can be provided on easy terms to 
encourage employees to build own houses. Rationalisation of these two major 
allowances and their inclusion as part of salary would also help government to 
get rid of the huge infrastructures established to manage these perks.  Finally, 
the long-run benefits of this policy of rationalising and monetsing of all perks 
including free/subsidised telephones, reimbursement of excessive medical bills, 
domestic servants, will outweigh the initial costs.    
 
                                                 
14See World Bank (2004). 
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Appendices 
Appendix Table 1 
Estimation of Markup on Basic Salaries 
BPS 
%age Increase 
on Basic Salary 
of Jun-91 Over 
“Total Basic 
Salary” 
July-May 1990 
%age Increase 
on Basic Salary 
of June-94 Over 
“Total Basic 
Salary” 
July-May 1991 
%age Increase 
on Basic Salary 
of Dec. 2001 Over 
“Total Basic 
Salary” 
June 1994– 
Nov. 2001 
%age Increase 
on Basic Salary 
Of July-05 
“Total Basic 
Salary” 
Dec. 2001– 
June-04 
22 26.0 20.0 49.5 15.0 
21 26.4 20.1 49.5 15.0 
20 26.3 19.6 49.5 15.0 
19 26.3 19.0 49.5 15.0 
18 26.3 17.1 49.5 15.0 
17 26.3 15.6 49.5 15.0 
16 26.3 12.0 22.2 15.0 
15 26.4 10.5 20.0 15.0 
14 26.4 9.7 19.0 15.0 
13 26.5 9.3 17.6 15.0 
12 27.0 8.3 16.4 15.0 
11 27.4 7.6 15.3 15.0 
10 28.5 6.9 14.4 15.0 
9 29.8 6.8 14.0 15.0 
8 31.2 5.9 13.0 15.0 
7 32.7 5.4 12.0 15.0 
6 33.5 5.0 11.3 15.0 
5 34.4 4.6 10.6 15.0 
4 35.4 4.2 10.0 15.0 
3 36.4 3.7 9.3 15.0 
2 37.5 2.9 8.5 15.0 
1 39.4 2.7 8.0 15.0 
Average Markup 29.5 9.9 23.6 15.0 
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Appendix Table 2 
Revised Basic Pay Scales with Stages 
BPS 
Existing Pay 
Scales 
1/6/1991 Stages 
Existing Pay 
Scales 
1/6/1994 Stages 
Existing Pay 
Scales 
1/7/2001 Stages 
Existing Pay 
Scales 
1/7/2005 Stages 
22 8075-450-12575 10 10900-610-17000 10 17440-1250-34940 14 20055-1440-40215 14 
21 7535-405-11585 10 10190-545-15640 10 16305-1070-31285 14 18750-1230-35970 14 
20 6810-325-10060 10 9195-440-13595 10 14710-950-28010 14 16915-1095-32245 14 
19 5740-285-8590 10 7750-385-11600 10 12400-615-24700 20 14260-705-28360 20 
18 3765-271-6475 10 5085-366-8745 10 8135-585-19835 20 9355-675-22855 20 
17 2870-215-5450 12 3880-290-7360 12 6210-465-15510 20 7140-535-17840 20 
16 1875-146-4065 15 2535-197-5490 15 3805-295-12655 30 4375-340-14575 30 
15 1620-131-3585 15 2190-177-4845 15 3285-265-11235 30 3780-305-12930 30 
14 1530-119-3315 15 2065-161-4480 15 3100-240-10300 30 3565-275-11815 30 
13 1440-107-3045 15 1950-144-4110 15 2925-215-9375 30 3365-245-10715 30 
12 1355-96-2795 15 1830-130-3780 15 2745-195-8595 30 3155-225-9905 30 
11 1275-86-2565 15 1725-116-3465 15 2590-175-7840 30 2980-200-8980 30 
10 1230-79-2415 15 1660-107-3265 15 2490-160-7290 30 2865-185-8415 30 
9 1185-72-2265 15 1605-97-3060 15 2410-145-6760 30 2770-165-7720 30 
8 1140-65-2115 15 1540-88-2860 15 2310-130-6210 30 2655-150-7155 30 
7 1095-60-1995 15 1480-81-2695 15 2220-120-5820 30 2555-140-6755 30 
6 1065-54-1875 15 1440-73-2535 15 2160-110-5460 30 2485-125-6235 30 
5 1035-49-1770 15 1400-66-2390 15 2100-100-5100 30 2415-115-5865 30 
4 1005-43-1650 15 1360-58-2230 15 2040-85-4590 30 2345-100-5345 30 
3 975-37-1530 15 1320-50-2070 15 1980-75-4230 30 2275-85-4825 30 
2 945-32-1425 15 1275-44-1935 15 1915-65-3865 30 2200-75-4450 30 
1 920-26-1310 15 1245-35-1770 15 1870-55-3520 30 2150-65-4100 30 
  1:9  1:9  1:9  1:9  
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Appendix Table 3 
Grade No. 
Scales 
(1-3-1972) 
Revised Scales 
(1-5-1977) 
Revised Scales 
(1-7-1981) 
1 100-2-116/8-140 250-5-280/6-340 250-5-280/6-340-7-375 
2 110-3-152/4-160 260-6-302/7-365 260-6-302/7-365-8-405 
3 120-3-150/5-180 270-7-326/8-390 270-7-326/8-390-9-435 
4 130-4-170/5-200 280-8-352/9-415 280-8-352/9-415-12-475 
5 150-6-180/8-220/10-280 290-10-350/12-470 290-10-350/12-470-14-540 
6 165-8-205/10-255/10-315 315-12-399/14-525 315-12-399/14-525-16-605 
7 180-10-230/10-280/15-370 335-14-447/16-575 335-14-447/16-575-18-665 
8 200-12-260/15-335/15-425 370-16-514/18-640 370-16-514/18-640-22-750 
9 225-15-300/16-380/20-480 390-20-590/22-700 390-20-590/22-700-24-820 
10 250-18-340/20-440/20-540 410-22-520/24-760 410-22-520/24-760-28-900 
11 275-20-375/20-475/25-600 430-24-550/28-830 430-24-550/28-830-30-980 
12 300-20-400/25-525/25-650 460-28-600/30-900 460-28-600/30-900-32-1060 
13 325-25-450/25-575/25-700 490-30-790/32-950 490-30-790/32-950-35-1125 
14 350-25-475/25-600/30-750 520-30-730/35-1010 520-30-730/35-1010-40-1210 
15 375-25-500/30-650/35-825 550-35-900/40-1100 550-35-900/40-1100-50-1350 
16 400-35-750/50-1000 625-40-825/50-1325 625-40-825/50-1325-60-1625 
17 500-50-1000/50-1250 900-50-1150/60-1750 900-50-1150/60-1750-100-2250 
18 1000-75-1750 1350-75-1650/100-2150 1350-75-1650/100-2650 
19 1800-80-2200 2250-100-2750 2250-100-3050 
20 2300-100-2600 2600-125-3225 2600-125-3600 
21 2750 3000-150-3750 3000-150-4200 
22 3000 3250-200-4250 3250-200-4850 
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